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ABSTRACT

In 2008, jeweler Tiffany & Co. ("Tiffany") commenced an action against eBay after discovering that a
significant amount of counterfeit Tiffany jewelry was being sold on the online auction house. Tiffany
had previously used eBay's Verified Rights Owner program to report the infringement and pursued
enforcement actions against individual sellers. Nevertheless, Tiffany sued eBay for various causes of
action, including contributory trademark infringement. The Second Circuit held that online service
providers like eBay are not liable for contributory trademark infringement unless they have specific
knowledge of particular instances of infringement. Due to the ruling, Tiffany bears the burden for
policing its marks online while eBay and other service providers may continue with present business
models. This comment proposes subpoena legislation similar to the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act to better balance the interests of trademark owners and service providers by providing a way for
trademark owners to request infringers' information while allowing online service providers to
function.
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RIGHTS VERSUS COMMERCE: BALANCING ONLINE TRADEMARK POLICING
WITH THE EMERGING ONLINE MARKETPLACE
JESSICA L. HILLIARD*

"This, I take it, was not purchased at Tiffany's?"
"No. Actually it was purchased concurrent with, uh, well, actually came inside
of... well, a box of Cracker Jack."1

INTRODUCTION

Tiffany & Co., famous jewelry maker and proprietor of the "coveted blue boxes,"2
found a nasty surprise after conducting research into the online resale of its luxury
items. On eBay, the online marketplace where millions of Internet users congregate
to buy and sell goods, seventy-three percent of the items listed as Tiffany jewelry
were counterfeits. 3 eBay derived substantial benefit from the sale of counterfeit and
real Tiffany items. 4 In a five-year period eBay saw sales of over 450,000 pieces of
Tiffany jewelry.5 While Tiffany scrambled to eliminate counterfeit items online 6,
eBay took in an estimated $4.1 million in four years alone from purported "Tiffany"
goods. 7
When Tiffany learned that counterfeit items bearing its distinct Tiffany
trademarks were appearing on eBay, it began to request removal of the items
according to eBay's anti-fraud policies. 8 Though eBay identified and shut down as
many counterfeit jewelry auctions as possible, fake Tiffany goods remained for sale
*©CJessica L. Hilliard 2011. J.D. Candidate, May 2012, The John Marshall Law School. B.S.

Bioengineering, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, May 2009. I would like to thank my
family and friends for their continued support. I would also like to thank my editors Kelly Hejlik,
Jacobi Fields, and Wasim Bleibel, as well as Professor Maureen Collins and Natalie Remien.
Finally, thank you to the staff of The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law for their
invaluable editorial assistance. Any mistakes in this article are my own.
1 BREAKFAST AT TIFFANY'S (Jurow-Shepherd Productions 1961).
2Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
3Id. at 482 (noting that Tiffany itself conducted the study that determined this figure). In the
same survey, Tiffany also concluded that only five percent of the Tiffany listings were genuine
Tiffany jewelry. Id.
See id. at 481 (stating that eBay generated a substantial amount of revenue from Tiffany
products in the Jewelry and Watches category of eBay's website).
Id.
6 Id.
Tiffany brought over 600 domestic and international "enforcement actions" against
individual counterfeiters, performed custom seizures, and issued cease and desist actions. Id. At
this time, eBay buyers were complaining to Tiffany about fake Tiffany jewelry that they had
purchased from supposedly authentic listings on eBay. Id. at 487. Between April 2003 and October
2007, Tiffany received over 3900 complaints from dissatisfied buyers alleging that sellers were
listing counterfeit "Tiffany" items. Id. Four of these complaints involved eBay sellers that had
previously been reported to eBay as alleged infringers selling counterfeit goods. Id.
? Id. at 4 81.
8 Id. at 483 (noting that in August 2003, Tiffany was the second-highest reporter in eBay's
main counterfeit reporting system).
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on the website because eBay refused to ban the general sale of Tiffany merchandise. 9
Burdened with the duty of policing its marks, Tiffany brought lawsuits against
individual sellers on eBay and then finally against eBay directly.10 The jeweler filed
suit in district court in the Southern District of New York and sought to hold eBay
liable for direct and contributory trademark infringement, false advertising, unfair
competition, and direct and contributory trademark dilution."
eBay found the
contributory infringement claims particularly troubling because if eBay was found
liable for trademark infringement of its users, its business model would be in
jeopardy.
Part I of this comment illustrates the mechanisms eBay has in place to stop the
sale of non-authentic goods like the fake Tiffany jewelry. This section further
discusses the requirements of trademark infringement, both direct and contributory,
and concludes by noting attempts to address infringement in trademark and
copyright fields. Part II analyzes the legal and economic implications of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's ("Second Circuit") holding that eBay
was not secondarily liable for trademark infringement. Finally, Part III proposes
enacting legislation similar to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512,
to allow trademark owners to subpoena information of known infringers.

I. BACKGROUND

As a famous maker of luxury goods for more than 170 years, Tiffany has
invested extensive time and effort into policing the sale of its goods so it may
continue offering high-quality items.12 The distinct Tiffany trademarks ("TIFFANY
Marks"), found on various jewelry designs and packaging, identify the high-quality
jewelry maker as the source of the jewelry.' 3 Third-party sellers on eBay take
advantage of the demand for Tiffany goods by offering counterfeit items while using a
TIFFANY Mark as a descriptor.14 Under the Lanham (Trademark) Act ("Lanham
Act"), trademarks used in commerce can be registered in return for protection.' 5
Trademarks are "any word, name, symbol, or device ... used by a person ... to
identify and distinguish his or her goods" in commerce, where use in commerce is
"the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade."16 As the owner of all
TIFFANY Marks, Tiffany is entitled to nearly exclusive use of those marks in
commerce."
9 See id. at 482-83 (noting that although eBay reported that it removed suspected counterfeit
listings, the company refused to target listings with five or more items as automatically triggering a
take-down order, as per Tiffany's request, without further information indicating that the listings
contained counterfeit goods).
10 Id. at 481.
"1Id. at 469.
12See id. at 471-72 (describing Tiffany's extensive quality control measures, including
individual inspections of each product's composition, quality, and shape, the polish of the metal, and
the quality of the TIFFANY Marks).
's TIFFANY, Registration No. 1,228,409; TIFFANY & CO., Registration No. 1,228,189.
'14 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 487.
1515 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2006).
ToId. § 1127.
'1 d. § 1115(a).
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Exclusive use of trademarks is extremely important in today's global
marketplace where an infringer using trademarks on counterfeit items may steal
business from legitimate companies.' 8 Worldwide counterfeiting is estimated to
bring in $600 billion a year, and commercial losses due to counterfeiting are
estimated at $500 billion.' 9
Interpol, the world's largest international police
organization 20 , claims that the trade of counterfeit goods has grown eight times faster
than legitimate trade in the years since the early 1990s. 2 1 In addition, Internet
auction fraud is the most common offense reported on the Internet, constituting
nearly sixty-three percent of all complaints. 22
With widespread Internet fraud, trademark owners have difficulty combating
the spread of counterfeits online. 23 The Council of Fashion Designers of America
("CFDA"), for example, notes that the vast majority of its members cannot afford to
hire extra employees to monitor for possible counterfeit goods on websites like eBay,
or even to buy software to perform this function. 24 Even large companies like Tiffany
may find it difficult to police online counterfeits. 25 Between the years of 2003 and
2007, Tiffany spent $14 million on efforts to police counterfeit Tiffany jewelry and
devoted between 172 and 240 hours per month monitoring the eBay website. 26 To
combat the rise of Tiffany counterfeits on eBay, Tiffany used eBay's anti-fraud
mechanisms, including a fraud engine that identified suspect auctions and a Verified
Rights Owner ("VeRO") program that allowed Tiffany to request removal of the
auctions. 27 eBay polices third-party auctions on its website for possible trademark
infringement, and also allows rights holders to submit claims requesting the
takedown of allegedly infringing notices. 28
18Jeffrey T. Breloski, "S.O.S." Save Our Service Marks, 203 MIL. L. REV. 78, 99 (2010).
19Brief of the Council of Fashion Designers of Am., Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of

Appellants, Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-3947-CV), 2008 U.S. 2d
Cir. Briefs LEXIS 298, at *3-4 n.3 [hereinafter Brief of the Council of Fashion Designers of Am.].
The American Fashion Industry has been hit particularly hard, and between 33% and 45% of all
counterfeiting involves fashion products, clothing, and accessories, such as jewelry. Id. at *3. The
United States alone incurs a loss of $200 billion each year due to counterfeiting. The Committee on
Trademarks and Unfair Competition., Online Auction Sites and Trademark Infringement Liability,
58 REC. ASS'N B. N.Y. CITY 236, 238 (2003) [hereinafter The Comm. on Trademarks].

Significant

loss of20tax revenue is another economic problem governments face due to counterfeiting. Id.
About Interpol, INTERPOL, http://www.interpol.int/public/icpo/default.asp (last visited Oct.
16, 2011).
21 Brief of the Council of Fashion Designers of Am., supra note 19, at * n.3.
4
22Brief of the Int'l AntiCounterfeiting Coal. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants, Tiffany
(NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 04-CIV-4607), 2008 U.S. 2d Cir. Briefs LEXIS
307, at *6 [hereinafter Brief of the Int'l AntiCounterfeiting Coal.].
23See Brief of the Council of Fashion Designers of Am., supra note 19, at *6-7. Counterfeit
items can be posted on eBay at any time of the day, 365 days of the year. Id. at *6.
2
Id. at *6-7, 10-11.
25 Id. at *8-9 (noting that Tiffany spent the equivalent of 1.15 to 1.6 full-time employees per
month on monitoring the eBay marketplace alone).
26Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
27 Id. at 483, 491. From June 2003 to May 2004, Tiffany reported 46,252 eBay listings that it
believed in good faith to be infringing on TIFFANY Marks. Id. at 483. In total, Tiffany submitted
284,149 reports of alleged infringement on eBay before the at-issue case proceeded. Id. at 484.
28 See id. at 477-78 (noting that while eBay maintains an internal system for policing
counterfeit items in its listings, eBay also rested the responsibility on trademark owners policing
their own marks and reporting possible trademark infringement).
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This section first discusses how Tiffany actively engaged in the VeRO program,
but chose to file claims directly against eBay when the VeRO program was
ineffective. 29 A discussion follows on the exclusive rights that trademark owners are
granted and how they alone are responsible for protecting those rights.30 After
discussing the legal doctrines of direct and contributory trademark infringement, this
section concludes by noting similar situations in the realm of copyright law, and how
advances in copyright law may prove applicable to trademark use on online service
providers.

A. eBay's Business Model

1. The eBay Auction Process
eBay's online marketplace allows buyers and sellers to interact directly, with
more than 100 million product listings at any given time. 3 ' Third-party users who
want to sell on eBay register their personal information with the website and sign a
user agreement before they are allowed to buy or sell items on the website. 32 For
illustrative purposes, the following is a hypothetical situation involving a third-party
user who seeks to sell her watch on eBay. After signing the user agreement, the user
will create an account and go through an auction process. A user may potentially
create multiple different accounts. Regardless of different account names, however,
if a user operates multiple accounts from the same computer, their computeridentifying Internet protocol address ("IP address") will remain the same.3 3
After creating an account, the seller begins the auction process by choosing a
category for her item, such as "Jewelry and Watches." 34 Using titles and descriptors
known as keywords, the seller then creates a listing that describes her watch.3 5 A
buyer interested in purchasing a watch on eBay can find the seller's item in a variety
of ways.36 The buyer can: (1) search for items by viewing general eBay categories;

29See id. at 481.

15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2006).
Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 474-75 (noting that there are around six million listings posted
on eBay each day); eBay Homepage, EBAY, http://www.ebay.com/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
32Tiffany,
576
F.
Supp.
2d
at
474;
eBay
User
Agreement,
EBAY,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-agreement.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
'D' CLIFFORD
S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING:
SURVEILLANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE § 21:3 (3d ed. 2007) (describing that an IF address is a
numeric address that is unique to each computer and can be used for identification purposes, and
that every computer must have an IP address to send and receive information over the Internet).
8'See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 481 n.12 (describing how the Court focused its attention on
the 'Jewelry and Watches' category and excluded other Tiffany items listed on eBay).
3S Id. at 474 (explaining that sellers are responsible for setting all parameters in the fixed price
or 'Buy It Now' listings, with such parameters including the price of the item and they may also
choose to post multiple listings of products at one time).
3o
31

36 Id.
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(2) search for items by typing in a keyword search; or (3) immediately view listings on
eBay's homepage containing the descriptive words chosen by the seller.i
After a buyer has successfully bid on and purchased an item, the buyer and
seller contact each other directly to arrange for completion of the sale.38 eBay
primarily receives revenue from the sale by charging the seller an initial insertion fee
(typically twenty cents to four dollars and eighty cents) each time she lists an item
and a final value fee (typically five and a quarter percent to twenty percent of the
final sale price) on each one of the seller's successful sales.39 In fact, thirty-three
percent of the revenue produced by the American division of eBay results from
insertion fees while forty-five percent results from final value fees. 40 Additional
revenue is generated from fees charged by Paypal, an eBay-owned company that
processes the sales transactions.41 Despite eBay's profit from the sales, however, it
does not directly sell or keep any of the items listed on its website at any time. 42

2. The eBay Anti-Counterfeiting Mechanisms
As described, eBay merely provides an online marketplace for buyers and sellers
to interact. 43 eBay does not hold itself accountable to inspect and insure that the
items are genuine products. 44 Although eBay cannot inspect goods, it has invested
heavily in anti-counterfeiting measures in an attempt to counteract the potential
harms to users and trademark owners. 45 eBay maintains a fraud engine, which is a
technological measure that searches for keywords in listings to determine if the
listings are potentially advertising counterfeit goods. 46
In addition to the fraud engine, eBay has instituted a set of procedures known as
the VeRO program so that manufacturers, such as Tiffany, can work with eBay to

37 Id. at 474-75. TIFFANY Marks, used as keywords, were listed on the eBay homepage and
when clicked would lead to listings containing the "Tiffany" keyword. Id. at 495. eBay also
purchased "sponsored links" on Google and Yahoo! to advertise that eBay users had Tiffany items
for sale on its website. Id. at 498.
38 Id. at 475.
39 Id.

4o Id.

41Id.; PayPal Homepage, PAYPAL, http://www.paypal.com/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
42Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 475 (inferring that because it never has possession of the goods,
eBay also does not usually know if the goods are received by the buyers after each successful sale).
43 hat is eBay?, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/account/questions/about-ebay.html (last
visited Oct. 16, 2011).
4' See Buyer Tips, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/tips.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2011)
(providing tips that users may follow to determine for themselves if genuine goods are being offered).
45 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 476 (noting that eBay spends around twenty million dollars each
year in promoting security and trust measures on its website. and has over 200 employees dedicated
to combating infringement and seventy employees working with law enforcement to bring charges
against counterfeiters).
46 Id. at 477 (noting that the fraud engine monitors listings that include words such as
"counterfeit," "knock-off," 'replica," and "pirated," as well as items with descriptions where the seller
admits he or she "cannot guarantee the authenticity" of the items, however it cannot conclusively
determine its authenticity).
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stop trademark infringement. 47 Under the VeRO program, a trademark owner can
report a potentially infringing item to eBay by filing a Notice of Claimed
Infringement Form ("NOCI").48 This form essentially states that the submitter has a
"good-faith belief' that an item infringes its trademark. 49 After verifying that the
NOCI contains all required information, eBay removes the challenged listing, which
usually takes place within twenty-four hours of eBay's receipt of the trademark
owner's NOCI form. 50 The user, however, is able to immediately re-post the items
under a new listing until the trademark owner submits another NOCI. 51 This means
that NOCIs are effective in the short term but may leave open chances for repeat or
future infringement. 52 To combat abuse of anti-counterfeit systems like the VeRO
program, legislation should be passed to allow trademark owners to request the
personal information of infringers so owners may target repeat offenders.

B. Tiffany v. eBay
Tiffany sued eBay after research showed that seventy-three percent of sterling
silver Tiffany items sold on eBay were counterfeit.53 Tiffany demanded that eBay
ban the sale of silver Tiffany jewelry, remove advertising and sponsored linkS54, and
ban any eBay seller from listing five or more Tiffany jewelry products at one time. 55
Tiffany's in-store and online policy of prohibiting the sale of more than five items is a
result of Tiffany's belief that multiple listings indicate counterfeit sales.5 6 When
eBay refused to concede to Tiffany's requests regarding the sale of jewelry, Tiffany
filed claims of direct and contributory trademark infringement, false advertising,
unfair competition, and direct and contributory trademark dilution.5 7 Prior to filing
a complaint, Tiffany had utilized the VeRO Program, and eBay had never refused a
NOCI request to take down allegedly infringing Tiffany items.5 8

47Id. at 478 (stating that as of 2008, "more than 14,000 rights owners participat[ed] in the
VeRO program.").
48 Id.

49Id.;
Reporting
Intellectual
Property
Infringements
(VeRO),
EBAY,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/tp/vero-rights-owner.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
50Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 478 (explaining that eBay Customer Service Representatives
("CSRs") review each NOCI for all relevant information before deciding to issue a takedown order).
51See id. at 477-78 (describing how a NOCI would affect the takedown of an identified listing
containing infringement, but not any future possibilities of infringing listings).
52 See id.
BS
Id. at 482.
5' Id. at 480.
5Id. at 4 81.
S6See id. at 481; but see id. at 482-83 (stating that: (1) the Court contrastingly finds that
Tiffany's assertion that more than five items in a listing indicates infringement is factually untrue;
(2) that Tiffany's CEO admitted that the five item rule was a shorthand solution; and (3) that the
reasons behind the rule have been determined to prevent the formation of a secondary market for
Tiffany goods, which is allowed under law, rather than a tool for preventing counterfeiting).
87Id at 469.
&3 Id. at 488 (noting that Tiffany itself has praised the VeRO program as a success that allowed
Tiffany to reduce the number of counterfeit goods on eBay).
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
("District Court") held in favor of eBay on all counts.9 According to the District
Court, the heart of the dispute was determining which party should bear the burden
of policing trademarks online; ultimately it found that the burden rested with
Tiffany.60 The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling, finding that eBay
was not liable for direct or contributory trademark infringement. 6 ' The Second
Circuit, however, remanded the false advertising claim because it was unclear
whether a consumer would be confused as to the goods' source when genuine Tiffany
jewelry was being correctly advertised. 62 The issue of false advertising, however, is
beyond the scope of this comment. The following sections will further expand upon
the District Court's finding of trademark infringement by providing an explanation of
trademark law.

C. Trademark Law
During its case-in-chief, Tiffany relied upon the Lanham Act and the protection
it affords trademark owners.6 3 While trademark owners have nearly exclusive use of
their marks under the Lanham Act, the Act does not allow owners to prevent a thirdparty from trading branded products, such as Tiffany jewelry. 64 This means that the
third-party can label a product according to its brand name, so long as it is clear that
the third-party is not implying an affiliation with the trademark owner. 65 Further,
the use of a trademark in keyword descriptions, when used in internal affairs of a
business, is considered fair use of a trademark.66 To illustrate these concepts,

59See id. at 526-27 (stating that Tiffany failed to carry its burden on all of the counts and that
it had a clear burden, as enumerated in trademark law, to police its own marks).
On
Id. (noting that the Court makes no finding as to Tiffany's probability of success in bringing
action against individual infringers using the eBay online marketplace).
61Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 114 (2d Cir. 2010).
62 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B)
(2006) (stating sellers are prohibited from misrepresenting the
"nature, characteristics . . . [or] qualities of his or her or another person's . . . "); Tiffany, 600 F.3d at

114; Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that false
advertising can occur under two theories: if the advertisement is false on its face or if the
advertisement, while not actually false, is likely to confuse or mislead consumers about the content
of the advertisement).
G6 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 493-94. See also Joseph R. Dreitler, The Tiger Woods Case - Has
The Sixth Circuit Abandoned Trademark Law?, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 38 AKRON L.
REV. 337, 340 (2005) (explaining that the Lanham Act, passed in 1946, was intended to "eliminate
deceitful practices in interstate commerce involving the use of trademarks," though the Lanham Act
also addressed other kinds of misrepresentations in commerce that did not necessarily deal with
trademarks); Jason Allen Cody, One Cyberswamp PredatorPops Up and Slides into Dangerous IP
Waters, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 81, 108 (2003) (noting that the main spirit of the Lanham Act was
therefore to "[protect] the public against deception," which was certainly more probable with the
misuse of trademarks and trademark infringement).
64 Dow Jones & Co. v. Int'l Sec. Exch., Inc., 451 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir. 2006); see Golden
Nugget, Inc. v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc., 828 F.2d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that a non-deceptive
description of a product using itsbrand name "has never been a violation" of a trademark).
G5See Golden Nugget, 828 F.2d at 591.
3615 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (stating that fair use isestablished where the use of the trademark "is
a use, otherwise than as a mark .. ,. which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to
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Tiffany jewelry sellers on eBay are permitted to buy and sell the jewelry while calling
it "Tiffany ring" or "Tiffany necklace." 6 Thus eBay, as a third-party trader, is acting
within the bounds of the Lanham Act when it permits its users to display the name
"Tiffany" when describing Tiffany products. 68

D. Direct Trademark Infringement
The Second Circuit first addressed Tiffany's claims of direct trademark
infringement.69 Direct trademark infringement occurs when an alleged infringer
uses a valid trademark in commerce without the trademark owner's permission. 70
The trademark owner must also show that the alleged infringer's use of the mark is
likely to cause consumer confusion as to the source of the product. 7 ' Therefore, to
prevail on a direct infringement claim, a trademark owner must prove: (1) that it
owns a valid trademark; and (2) that the defendant's use of the mark is likely to
cause consumer confusion. 72 The specific allegations of direct infringement of the
TIFFANY Marks included: (1) eBay's advertisements for Tiffany jewelry on its home
page; (2) eBay's use of the Tiffany name in sponsored links; and (3) eBay's role as
essentially "an officer . . . of a store selling infringing merchandise . . ."7

The Second Circuit held that eBay was not liable for direct infringement, as it
was unlikely that consumers would be confused as to the source of the product's
origin. 74 eBay showed there was no likelihood of confusion by successfully litigating
describe the goods or services .... ); see 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 409
(2d Cir. 2005).
67 Golden Nugget, 828 F.2d at 591.
G Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that the use
of "Tiffany" to describe products in advertising was essentially the same as using "Tiffany" to
describe products in the eBay listings, as in both cases eBay actually sold legitimate Tiffany
products).
69Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 493.
70 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
71 d.; Estee Lauder Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503, 1510-11 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that
there was a genuine risk of confusion between the 100% and 100% BODY CARE trademarks and
that the names were no similar that a reasonable customer could be confused as to any affiliation
between the two companies, even when the products were sold in different stores and at drastically
different price ranges).
72See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a); Savin Corp. v. Savin Grp., 391 F.3d 439, 456 (2d Cir. 2004). In
regards to the first element, a valid registration of the trademark with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office or an admission by the defendant that the marks are valid will suffice to satisfy
the first prong. Id. The second prong can be determined by using the eight "Polaroid" factors,
including:
(1) the strength of the senior mark; (2) the degree of similarity between the two
marks; (3) the proximity of the products; (4) the likelihood that the prior owner
will "bridge the gap"; (5) actual confusion; (6) the defendant's good faith (or bad
faith) in adopting its own mark; (7) the quality of defendants product; and (8) the
sophistication of the buyers.
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (24 Cir. 1961).
7S Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 494.
7'Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasizing that eBay never
used the TIFFANY Marks to suggest that it was affiliated with Tiffany, and that there was never a
suggestion that Tiffany itself endorsed the sale of Tiffany goods on eBay).
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a nominative fair use defense. 75 As previously discussed, the nominative fair use
defense permits entities other than the trademark owner to use the mark to identify
the product so long as a buyer would not be confused about the source of a product.7 6
To establish this defense, a party must show that: (1) the defendant's product would
not be identifiable without the use of the mark; (2) that the defendant only used as
much of the mark as reasonably necessary; and (3) that nothing suggests affiliation
with the trademark owner." This doctrine protects resellers, as resellers must be
able to correctly label the brand of the goods they are selling.7 8
The Second Circuit found that eBay engaged in nominative fair use because
eBay used the TIFFANY Marks only as much as was reasonably necessary to identify
the brand of the seller's goods without suggesting an affiliation with Tiffany.79 Such
minimal use of the TIFFANY Mark was found permissible because, by using the
TIFFANY Mark only as much as was necessary, eBay sellers were simply describing
the goods for sale without implying an affiliation with Tiffany.8 0 Further bolstering a
ruling against direct confusion, the court also found an absence of consumer
confusion, as eBay users presumptively knew that items were being resold.8 ' The
Second Circuit further found that requiring eBay to refrain from using Tiffany's
marks would be impractical because the marks were required in order to identify
Tiffany jewelry. 82 Accordingly, eBay was not liable for direct infringement because of
nominative fair use.83

E. Contributory Trademark Infringement
Third-parties that do not directly engage in infringement themselves may
nevertheless be liable for contributory trademark infringement. 84 In Inwood Labs.,
75 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4); Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 496-97 (noting that eBay did demonstrate
that Tiffany jewelry was not easily identifiable without the use of TIFFANY Marks to describe the
jewelry); Brief of Yahoo! Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellee, Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v.
eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2010) (No. 08-3947), 2008 U.S. 2d Cir. Briefs LEXIS 300, at *7-8 (noting

that the Second Circuit had not expressly recognized the nominative fair use doctrine, but that its

precepts directly apply in the instant case and it has direct bearing on the ability for online service
like eBay and Yahoo! to present advertisements in their businesses).
76 See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1999);
see also Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(explaining that the nominative fair use defense protects companies' aim to use the trademark to
identify brand names that would correctly identify products and bring companies business, not to
express the good will of the brand name).
77See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).
78See Polymer Tech. Corp. v. Mimran, 975 F.2d 58, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that the
trademark owner does not have to give permission to another company for resale of its trademarked
products).
71 Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103 (reiterating that eBay never implied that Tiffany was affiliated with
any of the website listings).
80 Id.
81 See id.
82 Id.
83 Id.

84John T. Cross, Contributory Infringement and Related Theories of Secondary Liability
Trademark Infringement, 80 JOWA L. REV. 101, 104 (1994); Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103.

for
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Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc. 85, the Supreme Court set forth contributory liability in the
context of trademark law. 86
The Court ruled that a third-party such as a
manufacturer or distributor assumes contributory liability if it "continues to supply
its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark
infringement .... "87 This was in marked contrast to the standard set out in the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition ("Restatement Standard").8 8 In the
Restatement Standard, a party can be liable for contributory infringement if it "fails
to take reasonable precautions against the occurrence of a third person's infringing
conduct in circumstances in which the infringing conduct can be reasonably
anticipated."8 9 In sum, where the Restatement Standard required service providers
to take affirmative precautions regardless of particularized knowledge of
infringement, Inwood held that service providers were only liable for contributory
infringement if they knew of or had reason to know of actual cases of infringement.90
The Second Circuit acknowledged that the controlling Inwood test had been
extended not only to manufacturers and distributors of goods, but also to service
providers. 9 ' Finding eBay to be a service provider, the Court analyzed eBay's
behavior accordingly. 92 The analysis included a two-prong approach examining: (1)
if the provider intentionally induced another to infringe a trademark; and (2) if the
provider continued to provide service to someone the provider knew was infringing a
trademark.9 3 The provider is liable if it had a reason to know that its service was
being used to sell counterfeit goods in particularinstances. 94
Applying this analysis to eBay, the Second Circuit found that generalized
knowledge, as opposed to specific knowledge, was insufficient to support a finding of
contributory infringement. The Second Circuit agreed with the District Court ruling
that the singular language of Inwood indicated that only knowledge of specific events

8,

Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982).

86 Id. at 854.

87Id. (noting
for ... [infringement]

that a manufacturer or distributor
"can be held responsible
where the manufacturer intentionally induces another to infringe upon a

...

trademark . . . .").
88 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27 (2007).
89 Id. § 27(b).
90Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 854; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note
88, § 27.
91See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that various

circuit courts have extended contributory liability for defendants in new categories, including
providers of services); see also Hard Rock Caf6 Licensing Corp. v. Concession Serv's., Inc., 955 F.2d
1143, 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that an owner of a swap market was subject to contributory
liability when a patron of the swap market sold t-shirts that infringed upon Hard Rock Caf6's
trademark); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that
there is no enumerated principle requiring interpretations of the Inwood ruling to only apply to the
named categories of manufacturers and distributors).
92Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 105-06 (noting that the field of contributory liability was ill-defined, and
although the Second Circuit was not the first American court to address contributory liability for
service providers, it was the first to address contributory liability in the context of the online
marketplace and online service providers).
DB
Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 854.
9'Tiffany, 600 F.3d1 at 107 (rejecting Tiffany's contention that the only relevant question was
whether eBay's knowledge put it on notice that infringement could be occurring on its website).
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would suffice to show contributory infringement.9 5 In its ruling, the District Court
also noted that the plaintiff bears a high burden in establishing contributory
liability.9 6 The District Court acknowledged that courts have "routinely declined to
impose contributory liability where a defendant. . . takes 'appropriate steps' to cut off
the supply of [the] product . . . " in question when it learns of possible infringement.9 7
The Second Circuit also found that eBay was not guilty of contributory liability,
as it was not "willfully blind."98 This meant that eBay did not turn a blind eye to the
possibility of counterfeit Tiffany goods being sold on eBay.99 The Second Circuit
acknowledged that eBay expended great effort in maintaining its fraud engine and
VeRO infringement reporting service.1 00 This effort was illustrated by eBay's prompt
takedown service upon notification of possible trademark infringement in its
auctions.' 0 ' By deleting allegedly infringing auctions, eBay was not contributory
liable, and combined with the absence of direct liability, avoided any duty to
Tiffany.102 eBay could continue to use its VeRO program to address specific instances
of infringement and continue using its business model.103 This ruling significantly
impacted trademark law and the balance of service providers and trademark owners
in the online marketplace.

F. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Copyrights, but not trademarks, currently have a piece of legislation protecting
owners from Internet fraud.104 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA")
allows copyright owners to subpoena service providers for various types of personal
9-Id. at 107-08; Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see
Brief for Amazon.com, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellee, Tiffany (NJ)
Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-3947-cv), 2008 U.S. 2d Cir. Briefs LEXIS 299, at
*11-12 [hereinafter Brief for Amazon.com] (explaining that adoption of Tiffany's position, that
generalized knowledge of infringement triggers a duty to act to prevent such infringement, goes
directly against the reasoning in Inwood and would water down the present standard, thereby
hurting online service providers).
96 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 508 (pointing out that the method for determining knowledge

under the Inwood standard requires a detailed factual analysis of the at-issue case).
97Id. at 516.
98 Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 110.
99Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 514 (noting that eBay seems to concede that it knew about
Tiffany counterfeit products being sold on its website because it independently created anticounterfeiting measures once it was clear that infringement was possible).
100 Id. (finding that the VeRO service and fraud engine both indicated that eBay was involved
in investigating possible trademark infringement on its website).
101Id. (distinguishing the instant case, where eBay actively pursued takedowns of counterfeit
material, from the Hard Rock swap meet cases, where the swap meet venue owner did not
investigate and disregarded any claims of infringement noted by the rights holder).
102 Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109-10; see also Brief of Elec. Frontier Found. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Defendant-Appellee, Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2010) (No. 08-3947),
2008 U.S. 2d Cir. Briefs LEXIS 305, at *8-9 (explaining that that Tiffany's claims for contributory
trademark infringement fail on a more basic level as NOCI requests submitted by Tiffany would
require physical inspection of the goods, which eBay cannot do).
10s See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109-10 (noting that eBay had no liability in this case and implying
that eBay's current business model could continue untouched).
104Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
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information when the copyright owner had a good faith reason to believe that his
copyright is being infringed.10
Section 512(h) of the DMCA establishes a specific
method for copyright owners to subpoena a service provider for user information of a
potential copyright infringer.106
As a trademark owner, Tiffany did not have legislation like the DMCA to fall
back on.107 The House of Representatives tried to address illegal conduct in online
marketplaces by drafting legislation to provide intellectual property owners with
website user information to assist in anti-counterfeiting measures.108 The legislation,
a bill known as House Bill 6713, was aimed at preventing the interstate shipment of
stolen property by adding language to the forfeiture, destruction and restitution
provision of the U.S. Code' 09 but the bill ultimately did not pass.110 As such, the
DMCA protects copyright owners, while trademark owners do not have such a
mechanism to fight online trademark infringement.111 Given the potential impact on
the marketplace, legislation should be passed to similarly protect trademark owners.

II. ANALYSIS
The Second Circuit's ruling implies direct consequences for trademark owners
and online marketplaces. This section first discusses the ruling's consequences from
the perspective of Tiffany and other trademark owners; such owners have the duty to
police their marks while online service providers may continue with present business
models.112 After discussing the effects on trademark owners, this section examines
the Second Circuit's ruling in the context of preserving the current online
marketplace. This section then concludes by comparing the current interpretation of
trademark infringement with copyright infringement, and copyright infringement's
regulation under the DMCA.

A. The Aftermath of Tiffany v. eBay: Consequences
According to the Second Circuit's ruling, Tiffany holds the burden of policing its
marks in the online marketplace.113 To do so, Tiffany will have to rely on previous

105 Id. §§ 512(g)(3)(C),
512(h); see John Soma et al., Bit-Wise But Privacy Foolish: Smarter EMessaging Technologies Call for a Return to Core Privacy Principles, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 487,
523 (2010) (noting that the main purpose of the DMCA was to protect copyright holders and to also
limit the liability of Internet service providers).
10o 17 U.S.C. § 512(h).
107Mark Bartholomew, Copyright, Trademark and Secondary Liability After Grokster, 32
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 449 n.20 (2009).
108 H.R. 6713, 110th Cong. (2008).
109 18 U.S.C. § 2323 (2006).
no0 H.R. 6713.
"' Bartholomew, supra note 107, at 449 n.20.
112See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d1 93, 114 (2d Cir. 2010).
"s Id. at 109.
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anti-counterfeiting methods that have proven ineffective in the past,114 and continue
to spend millions of dollars on in-house anti-counterfeiting methods.11 Employees
dedicated to monitoring eBay, as well as other online marketplaces, may be
maintained in order to continue present anti-counterfeiting efforts.116 Tiffany will
also have to continue using eBay's VeRO program to report suspected counterfeit
items in eBay listings, which Tiffany has already deemed ineffective.117 Looking at
the wider online marketplace, other trademark owners may need to utilize the above
methods to prevent trademark infringement online.

1. Economic and Other Burdens on Trademark Owners
Even though the Second Circuit's ruling lacks the overarching power of a United
States Supreme Court ruling, Tiffany v. eBay could signal a significant blow to all
trademark holders around the world, even in industries far removed from Tiffany
jewelry.118 Worldwide counterfeiting is estimated to cause annual commercial losses
of $500 billion.119 As Internet auction fraud is the number one Internet offense,
trademark owners face an expensive but essential battle to stop the unauthorized use
of trademarks.120

a. The Costs of Trademark Policing
The Second Circuit's ruling places the burden of policing trademarks squarely
upon trademark owners, thereby requiring the owners to monitor eBay and all other
potentially infringing websites at all times.121 The ruling does not discriminate
between large companies, like Tiffany, and small companies.122 It instead requires
businesses of all sizes to establish their own trademark policing methods.123 Even for
larger companies, the financial burden required to effectively police marks is
unknown.124 Such policing mechanisms potentially require the allocation of funds to
anti-counterfeiting software programs, the hiring of extra employees to monitor the
Internet, the filing of lawsuits against direct infringers, and other costs.125
Industries comprised of small businesses, such as the fashion industry, contend that

114 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that
Tiffany found a substantial amount counterfeit tiffany items on eBay, even after using the VeRO
system).
"1 Id. at 484.
116See Brief of the Council of Fashion Designers of Am., supra note 19, at *10-11.
117See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 484-85 (noting that Tiffany claimed it was not possible to
catch all instances of infringement on eBay to report via the VeRO system).
118Brief of the Council of Fashion Designers of Am., supra note 19, at *7.
119 Id. at *3 n.2.
120 Brief

of the Int'l AntiCounterfeiting Coal., supra note 22, at *6.
of the Council of Fashion Designers of Am., supra note 19, at *6.
122Id. at *6-7.
123 Id
124 Id.
125 Id. at *10-11.
121 Brief
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it would be nearly impossible for most small business members to carry the burden of
policing their own marks.126
The CFDA, with small and large fashion house members, notes that most
members cannot afford anti-counterfeiting methods, such as software or extra
employees.1 27 Even large fashion houses belonging to the CFDA, such as Liz
Claiborne, Inc., have struggled with allotting funds to hire employees to monitor
eBay and similar websites.128 The burden of policing marks, and even the burden of
effectively using eBay's VeRO program, is nearly cost-prohibitive for large companies
such as Tiffany, and therefore even more pronounced for small and emerging
businesses looking to enter the marketplace.1 29
Others may argue, however, that small companies may not need to allocate as
much money to trademark protection as otherwise claimed. Counterfeit brand items
typically involve only the brands of extremely popular products produced by large
companies, which are in demand from consumers.13 0 Such large companies, it may
be argued, have plentiful economic resources. As seen with Tiffany, however, large
resources do not necessarily translate into efficient and successful anti-counterfeiting
results.131

b. Trademark Owners' Loss of Goodwill
Tiffany and other trademark owners suffer more than just a financial loss when
counterfeit items are sold in an online marketplace such as eBay. Customers that
have bought allegedly counterfeit items on eBay must contact the brand owners for
verification that the item is genuine. 32 Trademark owners like Tiffany are then left
with a choice to either allocate even more resources to authenticating the goods or to
refuse the consumer requests.13 3 Trademark owners like Tiffany that deny requests
to authenticate goods sold by third-parties suffer damage to their reputation and
consumer goodwill towards the brand.134

2. Service Providers: Business as Usual
Service providers, on the other hand, are presented with fewer problems in the
wake of Tiffany v. eBay. The Second Circuit sought to update the principles of
126Id. (further noting that the majority of small fashion houses do not even have an attorney
on staff to advise on these issues).
Id.
128 Id. at *11-12 (describing the harm clone to Liz Claiborne's Juicy Couture and Kate Spade
brands when the company was forced to eliminate an employee position for monitoring eBay for
127

counterfeits).
129 Id. at *12.
13o Counterfeit

Alert,

http://www.sennheiserusa.com/serviceandsupport

SENNHEISER
USA,
counterfeitalert (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).

See Tiffany (NJ)Inc. v.eBay, Inc., 576 F.Supp. 24 463, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
See id.at 487.
'ss Brief of the Council of Fashion Designers of Am., suprt note 19, at *16-17; see Tiffany, 576
F.Supp. 24 at 487.
134 Brief of the Council of Fashion Designers of Am., supra note 19, at *16-17.
'3'
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contributory liability, and placed the burden of policing trademarks on their
owners.135 The Second Circuit's ruling established a fairly demanding test that
trademark owners like Tiffany must meet in order to prevail on a contributory
infringement claim.136
By creating a distinction between a lower standard of knowledge, enumerated in
the Restatement, and a higher standard of knowledge in Inwood, the court skirted
close to overturning the previous interpretation of willful blindness.17 For example,
consider a situation where a seller posts a counterfeit item on the website maintained
by a service provider like eBay. Under the lower Restatement standard, the service
provider would be liable for contributory infringement because it would be able to
reasonably anticipate the possibility that a user could post a counterfeit item,
especially when the service provider never sees the goods. Under the Inwood
standard the service provider could potentially be liable for contributory
infringement if it was willfully blind to infringing conduct on its website.
The Second Circuit in Tiffany v. eBay, however, held that there is no willful
blindness unless the service provider chooses to turn a blind eye to specific postings
that it finds on its website. Trademark owners argue that both the "reason to know"
standard in Inwood and the Restatement standard cover the same types of
conduct.13 8 Trademark owners further argue against the application of Inwood by
pointing to the fact that Inwood was decided before a worldwide online market was
foreseeable and does not adequately address the modern online marketplace.13 9
The Second Circuit, however, found that Inwood was appropriate for the modern
marketplace, and Internet service providers like eBay greatly benefitted from
ruling.140 Under the ruling, eBay does not need to implement any further anticounterfeiting measures. The Second Circuit's ruling essentially protects eBay from
future claims of contributory liability.141
eBay is able to continue to conduct its online business in the same manner as it
did before Tiffany v. eBay, as long as the VeRO program (or a similar system) is in
place.142 This ruling, therefore, provides a high level of protection for eBay's current
business model against any type of trademark infringement claims that may be
leveled against it by a trademark holder.

See Brief of the Int'l AntiCounterfeiting Coal., supra note 22, at *7-8, 33.
Id. at *7-8.
137Id. at *10.
13Sd. at*10-11.
's1 Inwood Labs.,
Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982); Brief of the Int'l
AntiCounterfeiting Coal., supra note 22, at *4 (addressing the importance for the Court to clarify
how the Inwood rule applies to online marketplaces and urging the Court to apply a direct or
constructive knowledge approach to eBay's actions).
110See Brief for Amazon.com, supra note 95, at *8 (noting that the opposite ruling would have
horrible consequences for online service providers).
141Brief of the Int'l AntiCounterfeiting Coal., supra note 22, at *6 (stating that this may
"provide a road map for the sale of counterfeit products on the Internet .. ." because online
marketplaces will similarly not be accountable for all possible counterfeiting occurring on their
websites).
142See Brief for Amazoncom, supra note 95, at *24-25.
'ss

's6
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a. Preserving the Online Marketplace
Service providers enable millions of buyers and sellers to interact over the
Internet from places all over the world where they would otherwise have no way to
communicate or do business.143 The Information Technology Association of America
("ITAA") has some 350 corporate members, from small start-up companies to
industry giants like Yahoo! and AT&T.144 It claims that online services, including
eBay, lead to lower prices, a wider selection of goods, and other benefits.145
If the Second Circuit were to have applied the Restatement standard, finding
eBay contributorily liable when it could "reasonably anticipate" infringement
occurring on its website, the ruling would have damaged and very likely eliminated
online markets, even if service providers had VeRO-like takedown systems in
place.146 Under such a standard, eBay would be under an enormous burden to screen
out all counterfeit goods, an infeasible proposition given that eBay does not deal in
goods directly.147 In other words, it would be nearly impossible for eBay or other
online auction websites to police counterfeit goods without either restructuring their
businesses completely or banning the listing of any trademarked good if there was a
general reason to believe that counterfeiting was occurring.148
Small online
businesses relying on the resale market would be under a similarly high burden,
which would likely prevent millions of legitimate sales in the secondary market.149
A general standard of knowledge, as opposed to a heightened standard, would
also create new problems in legal interpretation for service providers, and it is
unclear what would constitute a provider's general knowledge of counterfeiting.150
For example, there is the issue of whether such a standard would rely on a certain
percentage of counterfeit items to trigger the provider's duty to act.11 If such a duty
was triggered, it is also unclear what duty would be required of the provider.152 In
113Miriam R. Albert, E-buyer Beware: Why Online Auction Fraud Should be Regulated, 29 AM.
Bus. L.J. 575, 578-79 (2002) (noting that the Internet provides a low-cost forum for consumer to do
business).
M Brief for Amazon.com, supra note 95, at *4-5.
145 Id. at *3-4.
146 Id.

117Id.;

at*114-15.

Catherine S. Neal, The Role of the Judiciary in Advancing Public Policy to Promote
Ethical Business Practices: Comparing Gray Market Tires and Tiffany Silver Jewelry, 19 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y, 171, 205 (2010) (positing that the Court was perhaps attempting to protect eBay from
a burden that was too high to overcome).
148See Katie Hafner, Tiffany and eBay in Fight Over Fakes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/27/technology/27ebay.html (quoting Hani Durzy, an
eBay spokesman, who said that "[a]s a marketplace, [eBay] never take[s] possession of any of the
goods sold on the site, so it would be impossible for us to solely determine the authenticity of an
item."); see also Jay Miller, Court Orders eBay to Pay $272k in Damages to LVMH Unit, MARKET
WATCH (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/court-orders-ebay-to-pay-272k-indamages-to-1vmh-unit-2010-02-11 (noting that French courts have previously ruled against eBay in
a counterfeiting case, and required eBay to stop selling both counterfeit and genuine Louis Vuitton
items and fined eBay when it failed to comply).
149Brief for Amazon.com, supra note 95, at *20-21.
15o Id. at *9-10, 20 (explaining how a general standard of knowledge would lead to direct harm
of consumers by eliminating "large swaths of legitimate commerce," thereby drastically shrinking
the availability of marketplaces and numerous kinds of goods and negatively impacting consumers).
15' Id. at *20.
152Id.
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Tiffany v. eBay, such a ruling would imply that a provider's duty would have to
extend beyond the report and takedown VeRO system.
This high burden would make it financially difficult for providers to police every
item on their websites, and would likely result in the removal of listings when there
was even a miniscule chance that counterfeiting was occurring due to the fear of high
litigation costs.15 3 This decrease in listings would hurt both online marketplaces like
eBay and consumers, as fewer products would be available.154
The specific
knowledge requirement in the at-issue case gives online providers room to conduct
business that would otherwise be unfeasible under higher standards.155

b. VeRO-Style Reporting Systems
The Second Circuit found that eBay's VeRO program enables a service provider
to adequately address specific instances of alleged counterfeiting once notified of such
specific instances. 6 Other online marketplaces may model their anti-fraud and
anti- counterfeiting measures on the VeRO program because the Court has ruled that
such a method can successfully prevent a finding of secondary trademark liability.
However, the ruling in Tiffany v. eBay only acts as precedent in the Second Circuit
and companies in other districts may not feel that they need to create trademark
infringement reporting systems like the VeRO program.157 Even within the reaches
of the Second Circuit, companies are not required to create VeRO-style programs, and
may choose to continue business as usual.15 8 Some companies have established
VeRO-style reporting on their own,159 and at present the VeRO program seems to be
the best option for trademark owners under the current interpretation of
contributory liability.
The VeRO system, while presenting the best option for balancing trademark
owners' rights with the survival online marketplace, is not without its own faults. It
operates by identifying alleged counterfeiting activity that can be identified only
after the eBay listing has been posted by the seller.16 0 In many cases, the eBay
auction or sale is completed before action can be taken by the trademark owner via
the VeRO program.11 Trademark owners claim that the late notice of the VeRO

153See The Comm. on Trademarks, supra note 19, at 14.

154 Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability, 47 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 239, 273-74 (2005); see also The Comm. on Trademarks, supra note 19, at 13
(pointing out that any increased costs incurred by the service provider may be passed on to the
consumer, further damaging the marketplace).
55See The Comm. on Trademarks, supra note 19, at 14.
156See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
157Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010).
158 See Bartholomew, supra note 107, at 449 n.20.
159Id.; see The Comm. On Trademarks, supra note 19, at 3 (explaining that though several
auction websites, including eBay and Amazon.com, developed systems to review posted auctions and
remove those suspected of infringement, infringing listings have not "been considerably reduced.").
16o Brief of the Council of Fashion Designers of Am., supra note 19, at *13.
161Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum, Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 04-Civ-4607), 2007 WL 4837670, at *12 (noting that Tiffany did not have
advance notice of listings claiming to sell Tiffany goods, and was only able to view the claimed
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system renders it largely ineffective in policing alleged counterfeiting.162 The VeRO
system also depends in part on identifying possible infringing items via the picture
displayed on each listing.16 3 This may pose a problem for trademark owners policing
eBay, as pictures included with eBay listings are often doctored or do not show the
actual items being sold.164
Events occurring after VeRO takedowns may also pose a problem for trademark
owners. Though eBay may take down a listing after receiving notification in a NOCI,
there is no guarantee that the seller will not try to sell the same items under a
different name. This possibility only adds to the complexity of the problem, as it is
nearly impossible to closely watch each offender out of the millions of eBay users. 65

B. Solutions in Other Intellectual Property Fields
This upheaval in trademark law closely mirrors that seen in the arena of
copyright infringement. 6 6
The DMCA acknowledged widespread copyright
infringement on the Internet and addressed copyright owners' concerns by
establishing a method for subpoenaing service providers for user information.16 7 This
expanded solution allowed for an easier exchange of information in cases of alleged
infringement. Copyright owners could request the takedown of infringing material,
while also receiving information about the infringer than would assist in legal action.
A DMCA-style system may produce the same desirable effects in cases of trademark
infringement.
Such a balance between the interests of service providers and trademark owners
is clearly needed. Tiffany and other trademark owners face a costly burden when
policing their marks online, while requiring too much of service providers in regards
to knowledge of infringement on websites could potentially put companies like eBay
out of business. A solution can be crafted by looking to other fields of intellectual
property, namely copyright, where the DMCA provides a fair method for addressing
the needs of both copyright owners and service providers.

III. PROPOSAL
There is clear tension between the needs of trademark owners and service
providers in the online marketplace. This section proposes a solution that promotes a

Tiffany goods along with the public after the sale had already begun, which significantly decreased
the time Tiffany had to conduct an investigation).
162 Brief of the Council of Fashion Designers of Am., supra note 19, at *13.
163sId.
164 Id.

165 See Plaintiffs Post-Trial Memo, supra note 161, at *25 (noting that trademark owners are
not "expected to chase after every infringer.").
166 But see Hard Rock Caf6 Licensing Corp. v.Concession Serv's., Inc., 955 F.2d1 1143, 1150 (7th
Cir. 1992) (emphasizing the difference between the law of trademarks and the law of copyrights, and
noting that the line for secondary liability in trademark cases must be drawn more narrowly than
the line for secondary liability in copyright cases).
167 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2006).
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better balance between the interests of trademark owners and service providers, as
represented by Tiffany and eBay. First, Congress should enact legislation similar to
the DMCA to define procedures for trademark owners to request information about
primary infringers from Internet service providers. This would ease some of the
heavy policing burden on trademark owners while preserving the VeRO-style
notification systems that the Second Circuit has deemed acceptable to constitute
specific knowledge of trademark infringement. Second, eBay and other service
providers should additionally amend their privacy policies to reflect that users' IP
addresses may be released to trademark owners if the service provider is properly
subpoenaed.

A. Enacting Subpoena Legislation

1. Reasons for Legislation
New legislation should be enacted to require service providers like eBay to
retain the personal information and IP address of each user. This legislation would
mirror the development of the DMCA, and similarly update trademark law for the
new digital climate.16 8 As in the DMCA, the legislation would specifically include
procedures permitting trademark owners like Tiffany to request the personal
information and IP addresses of alleged primary trademark infringers.
This mechanism would increase the efficiency of trademark owners' suits
against primary infringers. Trademark owners armed with the IP addresses of
primary infringers could track the computer used to post counterfeit items rather
than the account name in each infringing posting. Users are able to sign-up for
multiple accounts with different user names, but if they use the same computer their
IP address will remain the same. By investigating IP addresses, trademark owners
can find any additional accounts run by the infringing users. Tracking IP addresses,
therefore, would save trademark owners costs on investigation of primary infringers
and ease some of the policing burden upheld in Tiffany v. eBay.
Service providers could argue that users are also free to use different computers
when posting counterfeit items to escape IP address tracking. Such extreme cases of
calculated counterfeiting could evade the aim of the proposed legislation. Users who
more routinely post counterfeit items, however, could be caught more easily if IP
address information was available to trademark owners.
Despite Congress's desire to update the law to address counterfeiting, it has
been reluctant to pass laws regarding the Internet.169 The proposed law, however,
168 See Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., An Unconstitutional Patent In Disguise: Did Congress Overstep
its Constitutional Authority in Adopting the Circumvention Prevention Provisions of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act?, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 33, 53 (2002).
169See Peter Linzer, From the Gutenberg Bible to Net Neutrality-How Technology Makes Law
and Why English Majors Need to Understand it, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 23-24 (2008) (noting that
six bills about Internet legislation died in the 109th session of Congress, including bills that dealt
with how online service providers operated their businesses); The Present and Future of ECommerce
for Small Businesses in the Private Sector and With Federal Government Agencies: Hearing on
Electronic Commerce Before the H. Small Bus. Subcomm. on Gov't Programs, 106th Cong. 2-3 (2000)
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would be an easier way to track infringers while maintaining the current business
models of service providers. This is the next logical step in better balancing the
burden on trademark owners with the interests of online service providers.

2. Text of the Legislation
The proposed statute would mirror aspects of both House Bill 6713170 and
section 512(h) of the DMCA.171 House Bill 6713 was a bill proposed by the House of
Representatives that was aimed at preventing the interstate shipment of stolen
property.172 It provides timely guidelines for how to deal with illegal conduct in
online marketplaces and how to control user information while allowing intellectual
property owners to gain alleged infringers' information.173 Section 512(h) of the
DMCA presents a practical approach that outlines the steps a copyright owner must
take in order to subpoena a service provider for the information of a potential
copyright infringer.174 Applying this practical approach to the aims of House Bill
6713 provides a new system to protect trademark owners' interests.
Under the proposed legislation, a service provider like eBay would be required to
retain contact information, including the telephone number and IP address of each
user, for three years.
A trademark owner like Tiffany that suspected direct
infringement on a website could subpoena the service provider, with good faith, for
the user's contact information. The trademark owner would then be able to
crosscheck the IP address received with IP addresses of known infringers on the
present or other websites. This would allow the trademark owner to determine if the
individual is operating other infringing accounts, and the trademark owner could
then add the IP address to its potential infringer list.
The proposed statute would be placed under Title 15 of the United States Code
to properly integrate it with current trademark law.175 First, the legislation would
establish that service providers would be required to retain user information that
could then be subpoenaed by trademark owners. The following text, which closely
mirrors that of House Bill 6713 and section 512 of the DMCA, would be appropriate:
[(1)] Duty To Retain Information About [Online Sellers] - It shall be the
duty of each [service provider] to retain contact information for three years
after receipt of that information from user.176

(statement of Deidre A. Lee, Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy, Office of Management
and Budget).
1(0 H.R. 6713, 110th Cong. (2008).
'7' 17 U.S.C. § 512(h).
172 H.R. 6713. The bill resolved to amend Title 18 of the United States Code, which deals with
crimes and criminal procedure. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1-6005 (2006).
173 H.R. 6713. This user information, however, only concerned users who sold high amounts of
merchandise on the service provider's website, and to effectively catch trademark infringement on
websites like eBay this standard would have to be lowered. Id.
'7' 17 U.S.C. § 512(h).
115 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (2006).
176 H.R. 6713.
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[(2)] Request - A [trademark] owner or a person authorized to act on the
owner's behalf may request the clerk of any United States district court to
issue a subpoena to a service provider for identification of an alleged
infringer in accordance with this subsection. 7 7
The legislation would go on to specify the exact method by which trademark
owners could subpoena the information. As described in section 512 of the DMCA,
the trademark owner would need to submit a copy of the notification, a proposed
subpoena, and a sworn declaration stating that the information sought will be used
to identify an infringer.178 Under the proposed legislation, tendering these items
would then trigger the following:
[(3)] Contents of subpoena - The subpoena shall authorize and order the
service provider receiving the notification and the subpoena to expeditiously
disclose to the [trademark] owner or person authorized by the [trademark]
owner information sufficient to identify the alleged infringer of the material
described in the notification to the extent such information is available to
the service provider. 79
Further, the definitions section of House Bill 6713 must be updated to reflect the
ability to subpoena for the IP addresses of users in addition to other user
information. This would allow trademark owners to use the mechanism described
above to discover the IP addresses of infringing users and possibly discover
additional cases of related infringement. This proposed language borrows heavily
from House Bill 6713 while adding in the new IP address provision, and should read:
[(4)] Definitions - in this section:
(A)
the
term
"contact information'
means
name,
telephone
number, ... address at which legal process could be served, [and Internet
protocol address].180

By adopting this balancing legislation, trademark owners will have additional
power to identify infringers by their IP addresses and other important contact
information. Beyond making such information available, service providers will be
free to conduct their business according to present business models.
Service
providers will, however, have to inform users of the possibility that their IP
addresses and other information may be released.

17717 U.S.C. § 512(h)(1).
178Id.§ 512(h)(2).
179Id.§ 512 (h)
(3)
.
18o Id. § 512(h); H.R. 6713.
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B. Amending eBay's Privacy Policy
eBay and other ecommerce websites should therefore amend their privacy
policies and user agreements to alert users that IP addresses will be an additional
piece of information available to VeRO users. Ecommerce websites, such as eBay,
collect personal information from users at the time they sign up, and then it stores
this information about its users on servers located within the United States.181 The
eBay privacy policy, referenced next to the user agreement on the user sign-up page,
explicitly states that its users' personal information (including name, address, and
phone number) may be shared with "eBay VeRO Program participants under
confidentiality agreement, as we in our sole discretion believe necessary or
appropriate in connection with an investigation of fraud [or] intellectual property
infringement .... "182 Rewriting the policy to mention the possible release of IP
addresses would support the proposed legislation and put eBay users properly on
notice. This small change, along with the proposed legislation, would allow eBay and
other service providers to continue with present business models while trademark
owners like Tiffany would have a more efficient way to pursue infringement
proceedings.

IV. CONCLUSION
In Tiffany v. eBay, the Second Circuit ruled that specific knowledge is required
to prove contributory liability of online service providers.
Though currently
controlling only in the Second Circuit's jurisdiction, this ruling presents a first step
towards preserving the current business models of online service providers, while
leaving trademark owners with the traditional but large burden to police their own
marks. This burden grows larger as the online marketplace continues to expand. A
better balance must be struck between the interests of trademark owners and online
service providers.
Congress must enact legislation that provides for a more
successful balance of interests, specifically by requiring the retention of user IP
addresses and establishing a DMCA-style subpoena system. This ultimately will give
trademark owners a more efficient way to identify infringers posting multiple
counterfeit items online while allowing service providers to continue using present
business models and preserving the current online marketplace.

181eBay User Agreement, supra note 32. User information is secured both physically and
technologically to prevent the unwanted release of the information. Id.
182eBay Privacy Policy, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/privacy-policy.html (last
visited Oct. 16, 2011).

